A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
The Art of Computer Programming Volumes 1-3 Boxed Set
The Art of Computer Programming Volumes 1-3 Boxed Set
Probabilistic encryption & how to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information
STOC '82 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Efficient and secure pseudo-random number generation
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
An efficient probabilistic public key encryption scheme which hides all partial information
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
RSA/Rabin least significant bits are 1-2- + 1/poly(log N) secure
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
RSA-bits are 0.5 + &egr; secure
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On the number of close-and-equal pairs of bits in a string
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
The Bit Security of Modular Squaring Given Partial Factorization of the Modulos
CRYPTO '85 Advances in Cryptology
The security of all RSA and discrete log bits
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Attacking Power Generators Using Unravelled Linearization: When Do We Output Too Much?
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Stronger security proofs for RSA and rabin bits
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On the provable security of an efficient RSA-Based pseudorandom generator
ASIACRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
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The ability to “hide” one bit in trapdoor functions has recently gained much interest in cryptography research, and is of great importance in many transactions protocols. In this paper we study the cryptographic security of RSA bits. In particular, we show that unless the cryptanalyst can completely break the RSA encryption, any heuristic he uses to determine the least significant bit of the cleartext must have an error probability greater than 1&edivide;4—&egr; A similar result is shown for Rabin's encryption scheme.