Evolving subjective utilities: Prisoner's Dilemma game examples

  • Authors:
  • Koichi Moriyama;Satoshi Kurihara;Masayuki Numao

  • Affiliations:
  • Osaka University, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka, Japan;Osaka University, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka, Japan;Osaka University, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka, Japan

  • Venue:
  • The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
  • Year:
  • 2011

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We have proposed the utility-based Q-learning concept that supposes an agent internally has an emotional mechanism that derives subjective utilities from objective rewards and the agent uses the utilities as rewards of Q-learning. We have also proposed such an emotional mechanism that facilitates cooperative actions in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games. However, this mechanism has been designed and implemented manually in order to force the agents to take cooperative actions in PD games. Since it seems slightly unnatural, this work considers whether such an emotional mechanism exists and where it comes from. We try to evolve such mechanisms that facilitate cooperative actions in PD games by conducting simulation experiments with a genetic algorithm, and we investigate the evolved mechanisms from various points of view.