Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Colonel Blotto on Facebook: the effect of social relations on strategic interaction
Proceedings of the 3rd Annual ACM Web Science Conference
Rough sets based on complete completely distributive lattice
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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We propose "Rip-off", a new multi-player bargaining game based on the well-studied weighted voting game (WVG) model from cooperative game theory. Many different solution concepts, such as the Core and the Shapley value have been proposed to analyze models such as WVGs. However, there is little work on analyzing how humans actually play in such settings. We conducted several experiments where we let humans play "Rip-off". Our analysis reveals that although solutions of games played by humans do suffer from certain biases, a player's average payoff over several games is roughly reflected by the Shapley value.