Heliza: talking dirty to the attackers

  • Authors:
  • Gérard Wagener;Radu State;Alexandre Dulaunoy;Thomas Engel

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg 1359;University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg 1359;Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg c/o smile - "security made in Letzebuerg", Contern, Luxembourg 5326;University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg 1359

  • Venue:
  • Journal in Computer Virology
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In this article we describe a new paradigm for adaptive honeypots that are capable of learning from their interaction with attackers. The main objective of such honeypots is to get as much information as possible about the profile of an intruder, while decoying their true nature and goals. We have leveraged machine learning techniques for this task and have developed a honeypot that uses a variant of reinforcement learning in order to learn the best behavior when facing attackers. The honeypot is capable of adopting behavioral strategies that vary from blocking commands, returning erroneous messages right up to insults that aim to irritate the intruder and serve as reverse Turing Test. Our preliminary experimental results show that behavioral strategies are dependent on contextual parameters and can serve as advanced building blocks for intelligent honeypots.