Profiling Attacker Behavior Following SSH Compromises

  • Authors:
  • Daniel Ramsbrock;Robin Berthier;Michel Cukier

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Maryland, USA;University of Maryland, USA;University of Maryland, USA

  • Venue:
  • DSN '07 Proceedings of the 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

This practical experience report presents the results of an experiment aimed at building a profile of attacker behavior following a remote compromise. For this experiment, we utilized four Linux honeypot computers running SSH with easily guessable passwords. During the course of our research, we also determined the most commonly attempted usernames and passwords, the average number of attempted logins per day, and the ratio of failed to successful attempts. To build a profile of attacker behavior, we looked for specific actions taken by the attacker and the order in which they occurred. These actions were: checking the configuration, changing the password, downloading a file, installing/running rogue code, and changing the system configuration.