Performance effects of architectural complexity in the Intel 432
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Protection and the control of information sharing in multics
Communications of the ACM
Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Capability-Based Computer Systems
Capability-Based Computer Systems
Information flow control for standard OS abstractions
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
Implicit Flows: Can't Live with `Em, Can't Live without `Em
ICISS '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Systems Security
Formal verification of a realistic compiler
Communications of the ACM - Barbara Liskov: ACM's A.M. Turing Award Winner
seL4: formal verification of an OS kernel
Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles
Improving application security with data flow assertions
Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles
Efficient purely-dynamic information flow analysis
ACM SIGPLAN Notices
Safe to the last instruction: automated verification of a type-safe operating system
PLDI '10 Proceedings of the 2010 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
A verified information-flow architecture
Proceedings of the 41st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages
Comprehensive formal verification of an OS microkernel
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
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Safe is a clean-slate design for a secure host architecture. It integrates advances in programming languages, operating systems, and hardware and incorporates formal methods at every step. Though the project is still at an early stage, we have assembled a set of basic architectural choices that we believe will yield a high-assurance system. We sketch the current state of the design and discuss several of these choices.