Founding crytpography on oblivious transfer
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Equivalence Between Two Flavours of Oblivious Transfers
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Achieving oblivious transfer using weakened security assumptions
SFCS '88 Proceedings of the 29th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Oblivious-Transfer Amplification
EUROCRYPT '07 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Oblivious Transfer from Weak Noisy Channels
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Efficient cryptographic protocols based on noisy channels
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Building oblivious transfer on channel delays
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Efficient unconditional oblivious transfer from almost any noisy channel
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
An analysis of the timed Z-channel
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
On the Oblivious-Transfer Capacity of Noisy Resources
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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In secure two-party computation, two mutually distrusting parties are interested in jointly computing a function, while preserving the privacy of their respective inputs. However, when communicating over a clear channel, security against computationally unbounded adversaries is impossible. Thus is the importance of noisy channels, over which we can build Oblivious Transfer (OT), a fundamental primitive in cryptography and the basic building block for any secure multiparty computation. The noisy channels commonly used in current constructions are mostly derived from the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC), which is modified to extend the capabilities of an attacker. Still, these constructions are based on very strong assumptions, in particular on the error probability, which makes them hard to implement. In this paper, we provide a protocol achieving oblivious transfer over a Z-channel, a natural channel model in various contexts, ranging from optical to covert communication. The protocol proves to be particularly efficient for a large range of error probabilities p (e.g., for 0.17 ≤ p ≤ 0.29 when a security parameter ε = 10-9 is chosen), where it requires a limited amount of data to be sent through the channel. Our construction also proves to offer security against unfair adversaries, who are able to select the channel probability within a fixed range. We provide coding schemes that can further increase the efficiency of the protocol for probabilities distant from the range mentioned above, and also allow the use of a Z-channel with an error probability greater than 0.5. The flexibility and the efficiency of the construction make an actual implementation of oblivious transfer a more realistic prospect.