Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange without NAXOS' Approach
IWSEC '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Security: Advances in Information and Computer Security
Stronger security of authenticated key exchange
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
A new security model for authenticated key agreement
SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
Okamoto-Tanaka revisited: fully authenticated diffie-hellman with minimal overhead
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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So far, there exist no two-pass authenticated key exchange protocols which are provably secure in the eCK model and meanwhile achieve perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. The paper proposes a new two-pass (one round) authenticated key exchange protocol which enjoys following desirable properties. First, our protocol is shown secure in the eCK model under the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. Moreover, our protocol does not use the NAXOS transformation, the drawback of which will be discussed in the introduction. Second, under the same assumption, we prove that our protocol achieves perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first two-pass (one round) authenticated key exchange protocol provably secure in the eCK model and achieving perfect forward security against active adversary.