A new security model for authenticated key agreement

  • Authors:
  • Augustin P. Sarr;Philippe Elbaz-Vincent;Jean-Claude Bajard

  • Affiliations:
  • Netheos R&D and Institut Fourier, CNRS, Université Grenoble 1;Institut Fourier, CNRS, Université Grenoble 1;LIP6, CNRS, Université Paris 6

  • Venue:
  • SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

The Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) and extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for key agreement protocols. We discuss security shades in the (e)CK models, and some practical attacks unconsidered in (e)CK-security arguments. We propose a strong security model which encompasses the eCK one. We also propose a new protocol, called Strengthened MQV (SMQV), which in addition to provide the same efficiency as the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementations wherein a tamper-proof device is used to store long-lived keys, while session keys are used on an untrusted host machine. The SMQV protocol meets our security definition under the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption and the Random Oracle model.