Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
The Gap-Problems: A New Class of Problems for the Security of Cryptographic Schemes
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
The Twin Diffie–Hellman Problem and Applications
Journal of Cryptology
Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange without NAXOS' Approach
IWSEC '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Security: Advances in Information and Computer Security
An eCK-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol without Random Oracles
ProvSec '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Provable Security
Comparing SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal for Diffie-Hellman Protocols
ProvSec '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Provable Security
Stronger security of authenticated key exchange
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
A new security model for authenticated key agreement
SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
A secure and efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol
EuroPKI'09 Proceedings of the 6th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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In this paper, we propose an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption with respect to the strengthened eCK-security (seCK-security) of Sarr et al.. To date, many AKE protocols either are provably secure under a rather strong and non-standard assumption named as the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption, or fall to practical attacks on the intermediate result leakage which can be captured by the seCK model. In order to remove the gap assumption and achieve stronger security requirements, we present the TMQV protocol using the twinning technique and the MQV key derivation method. With the help of trapdoor test theorem, TMQV is provably seCK-secure under the standard CDH assumption in the random oracle model. Compared with the related works, TMQV achieves not only stronger security but also higher implementation efficiency with weaker cryptographic assumptions.