A secure and efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol

  • Authors:
  • Augustin P. Sarr;Philippe Elbaz-Vincent;Jean-Claude Bajard

  • Affiliations:
  • Netheos R&D and Institut Fourier, CNRS, Université Grenoble 1;Institut Fourier, CNRS, Université Grenoble 1;LIP6, CNRS, Université Pierre et Marie Curie

  • Venue:
  • EuroPKI'09 Proceedings of the 6th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

The Exponential Challenge Response (XRC) and Dual Exponential Challenge Response (DCR) signature schemes are the building blocks of the HMQV protocol. We propose a complementary analysis of these schemes; on the basis of this analysis we show how impersonation and man in the middle attacks can be mounted against HMQV, when some session specific information leakages happen. We define the Full Exponential Challenge Response (FXRC) and Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR) signature schemes; using these schemes we propose the Fully Hashed MQV protocol, which preserves the performance and security attributes of the (H)MQV protocols and resists the attacks we present.