A complementary analysis of the (s)YZ and DIKE protocols

  • Authors:
  • Augustin P. Sarr;Philippe Elbaz---Vincent

  • Affiliations:
  • Université de Strasbourg, France;Institut Fourier --- CNRS, Université Grenoble 1, France

  • Venue:
  • AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

The Canetti---Krawczyk (CK) model remains widely used for the analysis of key agreement protocols. We recall the CK model, and its variant used for the analysis of the HMQV protocol, the CK$_\text{HMQV}$ model; we recall also some of the limitations of these models. Next, we show that the (s)YZ protocols do not achieve their claimed CK$_\text{HMQV}$ security. Furthermore, we show that they do not achieve their claimed computational fairness. Our attack suggests that no two---pass key establishment protocol can achieve this attribute. We show also that the Deniable Internet Key Exchange fails in authentication; this illustrates the inability of capturing some impersonation attacks in the CK model. Besides, we propose a secure, efficient, and deniable protocol, geared to the post peer specified model.