Comparing the pre- and post-specified peer models for key agreement

Authors:
Alfred Menezes;Berkant Ustaoglu
Affiliations:
Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada.;Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada
Venue:
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
Year:
2009

Citing 12
Cited 6

Authentication and authenticated key exchanges

Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Entity authentication and key distribution

CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
An Efficient Protocol for Authenticated Key Agreement

Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Security Analysis of IKE's Signature-Based Key-Exchange Protocol

CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication

Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS

Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Security arguments for the UM key agreement protocol in the NIST SP 800-56A standard

Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Stronger security of authenticated key exchange

ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
Authenticated key exchange and key encapsulation in the standard model

ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
Examining indistinguishability-based proof models for key establishment protocols

ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol

CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security analysis of KEA authenticated key exchange protocol

PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography

A new security model for authenticated key agreement

SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
Ephemeral key leakage resilient and efficient ID-AKEs that can share identities, private and master keys

Pairing'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Pairing-based cryptography
On forward secrecy in one-round key exchange

IMACC'11 Proceedings of the 13th IMA international conference on Cryptography and Coding
A complementary analysis of the (s)YZ and DIKE protocols

AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
Strongly authenticated key exchange protocol from bilinear groups without random oracles

ProvSec'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Provable Security
Anonymity and one-way authentication in key exchange protocols

Designs, Codes and Cryptography

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In the pre-specified peer model for key agreement, it is assumed that a party knows the identifier of its intended communicating peer when it commences a protocol run. On the other hand, a party in the post-specified peer model for key agreement does not know the identifier of its communicating peer at the outset, but learns the identifier during the protocol run. In this article, we compare the security assurances provided by the Canetti-Krawczyk security definitions for key agreement in the pre- and post-specified peer models. We give examples of protocols that are secure in one model, but insecure in the other. We also enhance the Canetti-Krawczyk security models and definitions to encompass a class of protocols that are executable and secure in both the pre- and post-specified peer models.