On robust key agreement based on public key authentication

Authors:
Feng Hao
Affiliations:
Thales E-Security, Cambridge, UK
Venue:
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Year:
2010

Citing 9
Cited 3

Handbook of Applied Cryptography

Handbook of Applied Cryptography
An Efficient Protocol for Authenticated Key Agreement

Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels

EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Security for Mobility

Security for Mobility
Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS

Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Stronger security of authenticated key exchange

ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
On the importance of public-key validation in the MQV and HMQV key agreement protocols

INDOCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptology in India
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol

CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security analysis of KEA authenticated key exchange protocol

PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography

Security analysis of a multi-factor authenticated key exchange protocol

ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
A complementary analysis of the (s)YZ and DIKE protocols

AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
Deniability and forward secrecy of one-round authenticated key exchange

The Journal of Supercomputing

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Abstract

We describe two new attacks on the HMQV protocol. The first attack raises a serious question on the basic definition of “authentication” in HMQV, while the second attack is generally applicable to many other protocols. In addition, we present a new authenticated key agreement protocol called YAK. Our approach is to depend on well-established techniques such as Schnorr’s signature. Among all the related protocols, YAK appears to be the simplest so far. We believe simplicity is an important engineering principle.