STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Towards Practical Public Key Systems Secure Against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Off-the-record communication, or, why not to use PGP
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Multi-signatures in the plain public-Key model and a general forking lemma
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Deniable authentication and key exchange
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An Efficient Deniable Key Exchange Protocol (Extended Abstract)
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Composability and On-Line Deniability of Authentication
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Stronger security of authenticated key exchange
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
Okamoto-Tanaka revisited: fully authenticated diffie-hellman with minimal overhead
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Hidden pairings and trapdoor DDH groups
ANTS'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithmic Number Theory
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
On robust key agreement based on public key authentication
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
On forward secrecy in one-round key exchange
IMACC'11 Proceedings of the 13th IMA international conference on Cryptography and Coding
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Deniability and forward secrecy are two properties of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. Considering one-round AKE, Cremers and Feltz at ESORICS 2012 defined a security model with perfect forward secrecy. Based on their model, we consider different levels of deniability, and reveal some relationships of the session-key security and the deniability properties. The observations result in a simple method to give a deniable protocol with forward secrecy.