Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method)
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Multiplicative Masking and Power Analysis of AES
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Statistical Analysis of Second Order Differential Power Analysis
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Practical leakage-resilient pseudorandom generators
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Leakage-resilient pseudorandom functions and side-channel attacks on Feistel networks
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
LATINCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Progress in cryptology: cryptology and information security in Latin America
Adaptive chosen-message side-channel attacks
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Fresh re-keying II: securing multiple parties against side-channel and fault attacks
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Practical leakage-resilient pseudorandom objects with minimum public randomness
CT-RSA'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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Randomness extractors are important tools in cryptography. Their goal is to compress a high-entropy source into a more uniform output. Beyond their theoretical interest, they have recently gained attention because of their use in the design and proof of leakage-resilient primitives, such as stream ciphers and pseudorandom functions. However, for these proofs of leakage resilience to be meaningful in practice, it is important to instantiate and implement the components they are based on. In this context, while numerous works have investigated the implementation properties of block ciphers such as the AES Rijndael, very little is known about the application of side-channel attacks against extractor implementations. In order to close this gap, this paper instantiates a low-cost hardware extractor and analyzes it both from a performance and from a side-channel security point of view. Our investigations lead to contrasted conclusions. On the one hand, extractors can be efficiently implemented and protected with masking. On the other hand, they provide adversaries with many more exploitable leakage samples than, e.g. block ciphers. As a result, they can ensure high security margins against standard (non-profiled) side-channel attacks and turn out to be much weaker against profiled attacks. From a methodological point of view, our analysis consequently raises the question of which attack strategies should be considered in security evaluations.