Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Signaling Vulnerabilities in Wiretapping Systems
IEEE Security and Privacy
Language identification of encrypted VoIP traffic: Alejandra y Roberto or Alice and Bob?
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Differential privacy: a survey of results
TAMC'08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Theory and applications of models of computation
Private memoirs of a smart meter
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Embedded Sensing Systems for Energy-Efficiency in Building
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of data
Privacy-friendly aggregation for the smart-grid
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
I have a DREAM!: differentially private smart metering
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Privacy-friendly energy-metering via homomorphic encryption
STM'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and trust management
Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Minimizing private data disclosures in the smart grid
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
This paper considers the problem of resource monitoring. We consider the scenario where an adversary is physically monitoring on the resource access, such as the electricity line or gas pipeline, of a user in order to learn private information about his victim. Recent works, in the context of smart metering, have shown that a motivated adversary can basically profile a user or a family solely from his electricity traces. However, these works only consider the case of a semi-honest-but-non-intrusive adversary that is only trying to learn information from the consumption reports sent by the user. This paper, instead, considers the much more challenging case of a intrusive semi-honest adversary, i.e. a semi-honest adversary that is in addition physically monitoring the resource by modifying the distribution network. We aim at answering to the following question: is it possible to design a resource distribution scheme that prevents resource monitoring and provides strong protection? This paper proposes and analyzes several possible solutions. The proposed solutions provide different privacy bounds and performance results.