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Can they hear me now?: a security analysis of law enforcement wiretaps
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Overview of security issues of VoIP
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Many law enforcement wiretap systems are vulnerable to simple, unilateral countermeasures that exploit the unprotected in-band signals passed between the telephone network and the collection system. This article describes the problem as well as some remedies and workarounds.