Detecting LSB Steganography in Color and Gray-Scale Images
IEEE MultiMedia
Attacks on Steganographic Systems
IH '99 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Hiding
Hide and Seek: An Introduction to Steganography
IEEE Security and Privacy
Signaling Vulnerabilities in Wiretapping Systems
IEEE Security and Privacy
Information Hiding in Real-Time VoIP Streams
ISM '07 Proceedings of the Ninth IEEE International Symposium on Multimedia
Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Can they hear me now?: a security analysis of law enforcement wiretaps
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted Voice over IP Conversations
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Detection of hiding in the least significant bit
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing - Part II
Steganography in Inactive Frames of VoIP Streams Encoded by Source Codec
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
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It has long been believed that once the voice media between caller and callee is captured or sniffed from the wire, either legally by law enforcement agencies or illegally by hackers through eavesdropping on communication channels, it is easy to listen into their conversation. In this paper, we show that this common perception is not always true. Our real-world experiments demonstrate that it is feasible to create a hidden telephonic conversation within an explicit telephone call. In particular, we propose a real-time covert communication channel within two-way media streams established between caller and callee. The real-time covert channel is created over the media stream that may possibly be monitored by eavesdroppers. However, the properly encoded media stream acts as a cover (or decoy) carrying bogus media such as an earlier recorded voice conversation. This spurious content will be heard if the media stream is intercepted and properly decoded. However, the calling and called parties protected by the covert communication channel can still directly talk to each other in privacy and real-time, just like any other normal phone calls. This work provides an additional security layer against media interception attacks, however it also exposes a serious security concern to CALEA (Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act) wiretapping and its infrastructure.