Labeling images with a computer game
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial agency with audits
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
Theoretical Computer Science
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We study the combinatorial agency problem introduced by Babaioff, Feldman and Nisan [5] and resolve some open questions posed in their original paper. Our results include a characterization of the transition behavior for the class of threshold functions. This result confirms a conjecture of [5], and generalizes their results for the transition behavior for the OR technology and the AND technology. In addition to establishing a (tight) bound of 2 on the Price of Unaccountability (POU) for the OR technology for the general case of n 2 agents (the initial paper established this for n = 2, an extended version establishes a bound of 2.5 for the general case), we establish that the POU is unbounded for all other threshold functions (the initial paper established this only for the case of the AND technology). We also obtain characterization results for certain compositions of anonymous technologies and establish an unbounded POU for these cases.