Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sequential information elicitation in multi-agent systems
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Hidden-action in multi-hop routing
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Fault tolerant mechanism design
Artificial Intelligence
Policy teaching through reward function learning
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Value-based policy teaching with active indirect elicitation
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Combinatorial agency with audits
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Contribution games in social networks
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
The cost of moral hazard and limited liability in the principal-agent problem
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy
Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial agency of threshold functions
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
Theoretical Computer Science
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Much recent research concerns systems, such as the Internet, whose components are owned and operated by different parties, each with his own "selfish" goal. The field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design handles the issue of private information held by the different parties in such computational settings. This paper deals with a complementary problem in such settings: handling the "hidden actions" that are performed by the different parties.Our model is a combinatorial variant of the classical principalagent problem from economic theory. In our setting a principal must motivate a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf, but their actions are hidden from him. Our focus is on cases where complex combinations of the efforts of the agents influence the outcome. The principal motivates the agents by offering to them a set of contracts, which together put the agents in an equilibrium point of the induced game. We present formal models for this setting, suggest and embark on an analysis of some basic issues, but leave many questions open.