The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Balanced outcomes in social exchange networks
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategic network formation with structural holes
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bounded budget connection (BBC) games or how to make friends and influence people, on a budget
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Social and Economic Networks
On a Network Generalization of the Minmax Theorem
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The importance of network topology in local contribution games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Dynamics in network interaction games
DISC'09 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Distributed computing
Local matching dynamics in social networks
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Overlapping coalition formation games: charting the tractability frontier
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Local matching dynamics in social networks
Information and Computation
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We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a project will be successful to a different degree, and to measure the success we use a reward function for each project. Every agent is trying to maximize the reward from all projects that it is involved in. We consider pairwise equilibria of this game and characterize the existence, computational complexity, and quality of equilibrium based on the types of reward functions involved. For example, when all reward functions are concave, we prove that the price of anarchy is at most 2. For convex functions the same only holds under some special but very natural conditions. A special focus of the paper are minimum effort games, where the success of a project depends only on the minimum effort of any of the participants. Finally, we briefly discuss additional aspects like approximate equilibria and convergence of dynamics.