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We consider graphical games in which the edges are zero-sum games between the endpoints/players; the payoff of a player is the sum of the payoffs from each incident edge. Such games are arguably very broad and useful models of networked economic interactions. We give a simple reduction of such games to two-person zero-sum games; as a corollary, a mixed Nash equilibrium can be computed efficiently by solving a linear program and rounding off the results. Our results render polynomially efficient, and simplify considerably, the approach in [3].