The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fast convergence to Wardrop equilibria by adaptive sampling methods
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Networks preserving evolutionary equilibria and the power of randomization
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The complexity of game dynamics: BGP oscillations, sink equilibria, and beyond
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games
Proceedings of the 28th ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Convergence to Equilibrium in Local Interaction Games
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Convergence and approximation in potential games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Contribution games in social networks
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
A note on anti-coordination and social interactions
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
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We study the convergence times of dynamics in games involving graphical relationships of players. Our model of local interaction games generalizes a variety of recently studied games in game theory and distributed computing. In a local interaction game each agent is a node embedded in a graph and plays the same 2-player game with each neighbor. He can choose his strategy only once and must apply his choice in each game he is involved in. This represents a fundamental model of decision making with local interaction and distributed control. Furthermore, we introduce a generalization called 2-type interaction games, in which one 2-player game is played on edges and possibly another game is played on non-edges. For the popular case with symmetric 2 × 2 games, we show that several dynamics converge in polynomial time. This includes arbitrary sequential better response dynamics, as well as concurrent dynamics resulting from a distributed protocol that does not rely on global knowledge. We supplement these results with an experimental comparison of sequential and concurrent dynamics.