Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Correlated equilibria in graphical games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Behavioral experiments in networked trade
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: Specialization and niche formation
Theoretical Computer Science
Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Dynamics in network interaction games
DISC'09 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Distributed computing
Sustaining cooperation on networks: an analytical study based on evolutionary game theory
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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We study a natural extension of classical evolutionary game theory to a setting in which pairwise interactions are restricted to the edges of an undirected graph or network. We generalize the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and show a pair of complementary results that exhibit the power of randomization in our setting: subject to degree or edge density conditions, the classical ESS of any game are preserved when the graph is chosen randomly and the mutation set is chosen adversarially, or when the graph is chosen adversarially and the mutation set is chosen randomly. We examine natural strengthenings of our generalized ESS definition, and show that similarly strong resultsnare not possible for them.