STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Networks preserving evolutionary equilibria and the power of randomization
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Utilitarian resource assignment
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
The contribution of game theory to complex systems
PCI'05 Proceedings of the 10th Panhellenic conference on Advances in Informatics
A dynamic approach for load balancing
Proceedings of the Fourth International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: Specialization and niche formation
Theoretical Computer Science
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In this paper we consider Nash Equilibria for the selfish routing model proposed in [12], where a set of n users with tasks of different size try to access m parallel links with different speeds. In this model, a player can use a mixed strategy (where he uses different links with a positive probability); then he is indifferent between the different link choices. This means that the player may well deviate to a different strategy over time. We propose the concept of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) as a criterion for stable Nash Equilibria, i.e. Equilibria where no player is likely to deviate from his strategy. An ESS is a steady state that can be reached by a user community via evolutionary processes in which more successful strategies spread over time. The concept has been used widely in biology and economics to analyze the dynamics of strategic interactions. We establish that the ESS is uniquely determined for a symmetric Bayesian parallel links game (when it exists). Thus evolutionary stability places strong constraints on the assignment of tasks to links.