Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Selfish traffic allocation for server farms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Bounds for the convergence rate of randomized local search in a multiplayer load-balancing game
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Fast convergence of selfish rerouting
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Distributed selfish load balancing
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Fast convergence to Wardrop equilibria by adaptive sampling methods
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Selection of efficient pure strategies in allocation games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Convergence time to Nash equilibria
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
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We study how to reach a Nash equilibrium in a load balancing scenario where each task is managed by a selfish agent and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize its cost. The cost of a machine is a function of the load on it. The load on a machine is the sum of the weights of the jobs running on it. We prove that Nash equilibria can be learned on that games with incomplete information, using some Lyapunov techniques.