Special knowledge sharing incentive mechanism for two clients with complementary knowledge: A principal-agent perspective

Authors:
Mingzheng Wang;Changyan Shao
Affiliations:
School of Management Science and Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116023, China;School of Management Science and Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116023, China
Venue:
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Year:
2012

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Abstract

In this paper, we study how the firm share the special knowledge of two knowledge-complementarity clients by implementing a large and complex project which the firm out-sourced. Firstly, incentive mechanism for complementarity special knowledge sharing are designed for clients being risk-neutral and risk-averse respectively under the asymmetric information. Further, knowledge complementary effects and other relevant factors on the optimal incentive coefficient are analyzed. Lastly, the numerical results are reported.