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SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
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IEEE Security and Privacy
HOTSEC'08 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Hot topics in security
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PAM '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement
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PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
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SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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LEET'10 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, and more
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WOOT'10 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
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LEET'11 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats
Towards street-level client-independent IP geolocation
Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implementation
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IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
What's in a name: a study of names, gender inference, and gender behavior in facebook
DASFAA'11 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Database systems for advanced applications
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In this paper, we show how to exploit real-time communication applications to determine the IP address of a targeted user. We focus our study on Skype, although other real-time communication applications may have similar privacy issues. We first design a scheme that calls an identified-targeted user inconspicuously to find his IP address, which can be done even if he is behind a NAT. By calling the user periodically, we can then observe the mobility of the user. We show how to scale the scheme to observe the mobility patterns of tens of thousands of users. We also consider the linkability threat, in which the identified user is linked to his Internet usage. We illustrate this threat by combining Skype and BitTorrent to show that it is possible to determine the filesharing usage of identified users. We devise a scheme based on the identification field of the IP datagrams to verify with high accuracy whether the identified user is participating in specific torrents. We conclude that any Internet user can leverage Skype, and potentially other real-time communication systems, to observe the mobility and filesharing usage of tens of millions of identified users.