Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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Journal of Computer Security
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CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
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ICEBE '07 Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering
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STM'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and trust management
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ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
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EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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We describe information security requirements for a secure and functional Internet voting scheme. Then we present the voting scheme with multiple parties; this voting scheme satisfies all these security requirements. In this scheme, the voter gets a signed key from the registrar, where the registrar signs the key as blinded. The voter uses this signed key during the voting period. All other parties can verify this signature without knowing the identity of the voter, hence the scheme provides privacy of the voter. This voting scheme also satisfies voter verifiability and public verifiability. In addition, the scheme is receipt-free.