New guess-and-determine attack on the self-shrinking generator

  • Authors:
  • Bin Zhang;Dengguo Feng

  • Affiliations:
  • Chinese Academy of Sciences, State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Beijing, P.R. China;Chinese Academy of Sciences, State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Beijing, P.R. China

  • Venue:
  • ASIACRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We propose a new type of guess-and-determine attack on the self-shrinking generator (SSG). The inherent flexibility of the new attack enables us to deal with different attack conditions and requirements smoothly. For the SSG with a length L LFSR of arbitrary form, our attack can reliably restore the initial state with time complexity O(20.556 L), memory complexity O(L2) from O(20.161L)-bit keystream for L≥100 and time complexity O(20.571 L), memory complexity O(L2) from O(20.194 L)-bit keystream for LO(20.5 L), memory complexity O(20.5 L) and data complexity O(20.25 L)-bit keystream after a pre-computation phase of complexity O(20.75 L). It is well-known that one of the open research problems in stream ciphers specified by the European STORK (Strategic Roadmap for Crypto) project is to find an attack on the self-shrinking generator with complexity lower than that of a generic time/memory/data tradeoff attack. Our result is the best answer to this problem known so far.