Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Cooperation Issues in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
ICDCSW '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops - W7: EC (ICDCSW'04) - Volume 7
Selfish MAC Layer Misbehavior in Wireless Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
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Media access protocols in wireless networks require each contending node to wait for a backoff time chosen randomly from a fixed range, before attempting to transmit on a shared channel. However, nodes acting in their own selfish interest may not follow the protocol. In this paper, we use a mechanism design approach to study how nodes might be induced to adhere to the protocol. In particular, a static version of the problem is modeled as a strategic game (the protocol) played by non-cooperating, rational players (the nodes). We present a game which exhibits a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium that corresponds to nodes choosing backoff times randomly from a given range of values, according to any apriori given distribution. We extend this result to the situation when each player can choose a backoff value from a different range, provided there are at least two players choosing from the largest range. In contrast, we show that if there are exactly two players with different backoff ranges, then it becomes impossible to design a strategic game with a unique such Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show an impossibility result under certain natural limitations on the network authority.