Space/time trade-offs in hash coding with allowable errors
Communications of the ACM
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Wireless Networks
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Data-centric storage in sensornets with GHT, a geographic hash table
Mobile Networks and Applications
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Security in wireless sensor networks
Communications of the ACM - Wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
LIGER: implementing efficient hybrid security mechanisms for heterogeneous sensor networks
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
A key pre-distribution scheme using deployment knowledge for wireless sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Efficient and distributed access control for sensor networks
DCOSS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE international conference on Distributed computing in sensor systems
Location-based compromise-tolerant security mechanisms for wireless sensor networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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User access control in sensor networks defines a process of granting user an access right to the stored information. It is essential for future real sensor network deployment in which sensors may provide users with different services in terms of data and resource accesses. A centralized access control mechanism requires the base station to be involved whenever a user requests to get authenticated and access the information stored in the sensor node, which is inefficient, not scalable, and is exposed to many potential attacks along long communication paths. In this paper, we propose a distributed user access control under a realistic adversary model in which sensors can be compromised and user may collude. We split the access control into local authentication conducted by a group of sensors physically close to a user, and a light remote authentication based on the endorsement of the local sensors. We implement the access control protocols on a testbed of TelosB motes. Our analysis and experimental results show that our schemes are feasible for real access control requirements.