Model checking
Modeling Reactive Systems with Statecharts: The Statemate Approach
Modeling Reactive Systems with Statecharts: The Statemate Approach
The STATEMATE Verification Environment - Making It Real
CAV '00 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Model-Based Synthesis of Fault Trees from Matlab-Simulink Models
DSN '01 Proceedings of the 2001 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (formerly: FTCS)
Theoretical Computer Science - Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems (TACAS 2004)
Interactive Markov chains: and the quest for quantified quality
Interactive Markov chains: and the quest for quantified quality
Model-based safety analysis of simulink models using SCADE design verifier
SAFECOMP'05 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
Model Based Importance Analysis for Minimal Cut Sets
ATVA '08 Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis
Human error analysis based on a semantically defined cognitive pilot model
SAFECOMP'07 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
A method for guided hazard identification and risk mitigation for offshore operations
SAFECOMP'12 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
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The increase of complexity in aircraft systems demands for enhanced analysis techniques. Methods are required that leverage the burden of their application by reusing existing design and process information and by enforcing the reusability of analyses results allowing early identification of design's weak points and check of design alternatives.This report elaborates on a method that assumes a system specification in an industrial standard notation and allows to perform several formal safety analyses. Based on a collection of failure models and means of specifying safety requirements, the techniques produce results along the lines of traditional methods. We show how to combine traditional techniques, required by the AerospaceRecommendedPractice (SAE-ARP) standards, likeFaultTree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Common Cause Analysis and also how to automate most of the analysis activities. The methods described in this paper can be used as means to support the Certification process.