The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Adaptive Security for Threshold Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On Quorum Controlled Asymmetric Proxy Re-encryption
PKC '99 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Group signatures: better efficiency and new theoretical aspects
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
Efficient blind signatures without random oracles
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
How to Bypass Two Anonymity Revocation Schemes
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Designing Information Systems Which Manage or Avoid Privacy Incidents
EuroISI '08 Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics
Authorization architectures for privacy-respecting surveillance
EuroPKI'07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Public Key Infrastructure: theory and practice
Brief announcement: arbitrators in the security infrastructure
SSS'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
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Anonymity services in the EU may be forced by the new EU data retention directive to collect connection data and deanonymise some of their users in case of serious crimes. For this purpose, we propose a new privacy-friendly solution for incorporating revocation in an anonymous communication system. In contrast to other known methods, our scheme does not reveal the identity of a user to any other entity involved in the revocation procedure but the law enforcement agency. Another advantage is, that no user will need to provide more identifying information than his connection (IP) address, that is what he needs to communicate with the system anyway. The proposed scheme is based mainly on threshold group signatures and threshold atomic proxy re-encryption.