A key distribution system equivalent to factoring
Journal of Cryptology
How to break the direct RSA-implementation of mixes
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Communications of the ACM
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
An optimally robust hybrid mix network
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Efficient generation of shared RSA keys
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Almost entirely correct mixing with applications to voting
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An Efficient Scheme for Proving a Shuffle
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Fault tolerant anonymous channel
ICICS '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information and Communication Security
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure distributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Verifiable internet voting solving secure platform problem
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
Repelling detour attack against onions with re-encryption
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
Anonymous communication with on-line and off-line onion encoding
SOFSEM'05 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Theory and Practice of Computer Science
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We define a new type of mix network that offers a reduced form of robustness: the mixnet can prove that every message it outputs corresponds to an input submitted by a player without revealing which input (for honest players). We call mixnets with this property reputable mixnets. Reputable mixnets are not fully robust, because they offer no guarantee that distinct outputs correspond to distinct inputs. In particular, a reputable mix may duplicate or erase messages. A reputable mixnet, however, can defend itself against charges of having authored the output messages it produces. This ability is very useful in practice, as it shields the mixnet from liability in the event that an output message is objectionable or illegal. We propose three very efficient protocols for reputable mixnets, all synchronous. The first protocol is based on blind signatures. It works both with Chaumian decryption mixnets or re-encryption mixnets based on ElGamal, but guarantees a slightly weaker form of reputability which we call near-reputability. The other two protocols are based on ElGamal re-encryption over a composite group and offer true reputability. One requires interaction between the mixnet and the players before players submit their inputs. The other assumes no interaction prior to input submission.