Error oracle attacks on several modes of operation

Authors:
Fengtong Wen;Wenling Wu;Qiaoyan Wen
Affiliations:
School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China;State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
Venue:
CIS'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Intelligence and Security - Volume Part II
Year:
2005

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Abstract

In [7] Vaudenay demonstrated side-channel attacks on CBC-mode encryption, exploiting a “valid padding” oracle. His work showed that several uses of CBC-mode encryption in well-known products and standards were vulnerable to attack when an adversary was able to distinguish between valid and invalid ciphertexts. In [2][5] [6], Black, Paterson,Taekeon et al.generalized these attacks to various padding schemes of CBC-mode encryption and multiple modes of operation. In this paper, we study side-channel attacks on the CFB, CBC| CBC, CFB|CFB, CBC|CBC|CBC, CFB|CFB|CFB modes under the error oracle models, which enable an adversary to determine the correct message with knowledge of ciphertext. It is shown that an attacker can exploit an oracle to efficiently extract the corresponding position plaintext bits of any block if the target plaintext contains some fixed bits in a known position of one block.