Padding oracle attacks on multiple modes of operation

  • Authors:
  • Taekeon Lee;Jongsung Kim;Changhoon Lee;Jaechul Sung;Sangjin Lee;Dowon Hong

  • Affiliations:
  • Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea;Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea;Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea;Department of Mathematics, University of Seoul, Seoul, Korea;Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea;Information Security Technology Division, ETRI, Taejon, Korea

  • Venue:
  • ICISC'04 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

In [12] Vaudenay presented side-channel attacks on the CBC encryption mode cipher under the padding oracle attack models, which enable an adversary to determine the correct message with knowledge of ciphertext. Black and Urtubia generalized these attacks in several directions, considering various padding schemes [4]. In this paper we extend these attacks to other kinds of modes of operation for block ciphers. Specifically, we apply the padding oracle attacks to multiple modes of operation with various padding schemes. As a results of this paper, 12 out of total 36 double modes and 22 out of total 216 triple modes are vulnerable to the padding oracle attacks. It means that the 12 double modes and the 22 triple modes exposed to these types of attacks do not offer the better security than single modes.