Analysis of learning types in an artificial market

  • Authors:
  • Kiyoshi Izumi;Tomohisa Yamashita;Koichi Kurumatani

  • Affiliations:
  • ITRI, AIST & CREST, JST, Tokyo, Japan;ITRI, AIST & CREST, JST, Tokyo, Japan;ITRI, AIST & CREST, JST, Tokyo, Japan

  • Venue:
  • MABS'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Multi-Agent and Multi-Agent-Based Simulation
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

In this paper, we examined the conditions under which evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are appropriate for artificial market models. We constructed three types of agents, which are different in efficiency and accuracy of learning. They were compared using acquired payoff in a minority game, a simplified model of a financial market. As a result, when the dynamics of the financial price was complex to some degree, an EA-like learning type was appropriate for the modeling of financial markets.