Congestion control in multi-agent systems through dynamic games of deterrence

  • Authors:
  • Michel Rudnianski;Hélène Bestougeff

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Reims, ARESAD, Paris, France;University Paris VII – Denis Diderot

  • Venue:
  • WRAC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Radical Agent Concepts: innovative Concepts for Autonomic and Agent-Based Systems
  • Year:
  • 2005

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Congestion control in MAS is addressed through a network of agents communicating with each other, for issuing and responding to assistance requests. The network state is analyzed as a particular qualitative game, called Game of Deterrence. A congestion avoidance algorithm is proposed, on the basis of the game solutions. The relation between the type of game reflecting the structure of the agent network, and the occurrence of congestion is then analyzed, highlighting the impact of the network size, and leading to the alternative of either implementing the algorithm, or breaking down the global network in regional networks inside which the congestion occurrence probability is low. The method is then extended to the dynamic case through an example showing existence of cycles.