Key Exchange in IPSec: Analysis of IKE
IEEE Internet Computing
Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DOS-Resistant Authentication with Client Puzzles
Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Cost-based and time-based analysis of DoS-resistance in HIP
ACSC '07 Proceedings of the thirtieth Australasian conference on Computer science - Volume 62
Timed analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
Experimental measurements of host identity protocol for mobile nodes' networks
Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
AST/UCMA/ISA/ACN'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Advances in computer science and information technology
Anchor-less secure session mobility
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Security protocols
Examining the dos resistance of HIP
OTM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: AWeSOMe, CAMS, COMINF, IS, KSinBIT, MIOS-CIAO, MONET - Volume Part I
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Multi-layer security analysis and experimentation of high speed protocol data transfer for GRID
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
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The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) is an Internet security and multi-addressing mechanism specified by the IETF. HIP introduces a new layer between the transport and network layers of the TCP/IP stack that maps host identifiers to network locations, thus separating the two conflicting roles that IP addresses have in the current Internet. This paper analyzes the security and functionality of the HIP base exchange, which is a classic key exchange protocol with some novel features for authentication and DoS protection. The base exchange is the most stable part of the HIP specification with multiple existing implementations. We point out several security issues in the current protocol and propose changes that are compatible with the goals of HIP.