Examining the dos resistance of HIP

Authors:
Suratose Tritilanunt;Colin Boyd;Ernest Foo;Juan Manuel González Nieto
Affiliations:
Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
Venue:
OTM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: AWeSOMe, CAMS, COMINF, IS, KSinBIT, MIOS-CIAO, MONET - Volume Part I
Year:
2006

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Abstract

We examine DoS resistance of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) and discuss a technique to deny legitimate services To demonstrate the experiment, we implement a formal model of HIP based on Timed Petri Nets and use a simulation approach provided in CPN Tools to achieve a formal analysis By integrating adjustable puzzle difficulty, HIP can mitigate the effect of DoS attacks However, the inability to protect against coordinated adversaries on a hash-based puzzle causes the responder to be susceptible to DoS attacks at the identity verification phase As a result, we propose an enhanced approach by employing a time-lock puzzle instead of a hash-based scheme Once the time-lock puzzle is adopted, the effect of coordinated attacks will be removed and the throughput from legitimate users will return to the desirable level.