Partially-Specified large games

Authors:
Ehud Kalai
Affiliations:
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL
Venue:
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2005

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Abstract

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.