Distributed games: from mechanisms to protocols
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Congestion games with malicious players
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Impact of Asynchrony on the Behavior of Rational Selfish Agents
Fundamenta Informaticae
Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms for playing games with limited randomness
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Lower bounds on implementing robust and resilient mediators
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
The maximal probability that k-wise independent bits are all 1
Random Structures & Algorithms
Partially-Specified large games
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Multiagent learning in large anonymous games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Large-Scale Service Marketplaces: The Role of the Moderating Firm
Management Science
Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
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A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies. In the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players, however, it provides no guarantees. Some recent literature has focused on measuring the potential damage caused by the presence of faulty behavior, as well as designing mechanisms that are resilient against such faults. In this paper we show that large games are naturally fault tolerant. We first quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games -- λ-continuous games and anonymous games -- are resilient against Byzantine faults (i.e. irrational behavior), coalitions, and asynchronous play. We then show that general large games also have some non-trivial resilience against faults.