On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue: 31st IEEE conference on foundations of computer science, Oct. 22–24, 1990
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Optimization problems in congestion control
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Complexity results about Nash equilibria
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
On the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for (0,1) bimatrix games
Information Processing Letters
On the complexity of uniformly mixed nash equilibria and related regular subgraph problems
FCT'05 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
The complexity of uniform Nash equilibria and related regular subgraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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We are interested in the complexity of finding Nash equilibria with one uniformly mixed strategy (that is, equilibria in which at least one of the players plays a uniform probability distribution over some set of pure strategies). We show that, even in imitation bimatrix games, where one player has a positive payoff if he plays the same pure strategy as the opponent, deciding the existence of such an equilibrium is an NP-complete problem. We derive this result from the NP-completeness of graph-theoretical problems strictly related to this class of equilibria.