A Design Principle for Hash Functions
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
One Way Hash Functions and DES
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Collisions in SHA-0
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Efficient collision search attacks on SHA-0
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Finding collisions in the full SHA-1
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Merkle-Damgård revisited: how to construct a hash function
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of the hash functions MD4 and RIPEMD
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
How to break MD5 and other hash functions
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Collisions of SHA-0 and reduced SHA-1
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Practical key-recovery attack against APOP, an MD5-based challenge-response authentication
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
Classification of Hash Functions Suitable for Real-Life Systems
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Message freedom in MD4 and MD5 collisions: application to APOP
FSE'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
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A series of recent papers have demonstrated collision attacks on popularly used hash functions, including the widely deployed MD5 and SHA-1 algorithm. To assess this threat, the natural response has been to evaluate the extent to which various protocols actually depend on collision resistance for their security, and potentially schedule an upgrade to a stronger hash function. Other options involve altering the protocol in some way. This work suggests a different option. We present several simple message pre-processing techniques and show how the techniques can be combined with MD5 or SHA-1 so that applications are no longer vulnerable to the known collision attacks. For some applications, this may a viable alternative to upgrading the hash function.