On specifying security policies for web documents with an XML-based language
SACMAT '01 Proceedings of the sixth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
A fine-grained access control system for XML documents
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Secure and selective dissemination of XML documents
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Controlling Access to XML Documents
IEEE Internet Computing
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Data Engineering
k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Administering permissions for distributed data: factoring and automated inference
Das'01 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual working conference on Database and application security
Regulating access to XML documents
Das'01 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual working conference on Database and application security
Containment and equivalence for a fragment of XPath
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Specifying access control policies for XML documents with XPath
Proceedings of the ninth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Extending query rewriting techniques for fine-grained access control
SIGMOD '04 Proceedings of the 2004 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
A formal analysis of information disclosure in data exchange
SIGMOD '04 Proceedings of the 2004 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Secure XML querying with security views
SIGMOD '04 Proceedings of the 2004 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Data Privacy through Optimal k-Anonymization
ICDE '05 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Data Engineering
On the complexity of optimal K-anonymity
PODS '04 Proceedings of the twenty-third ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Rewriting XPath queries using materialized views
VLDB '05 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Very large data bases
Checking for k-anonymity violation by views
VLDB '05 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Very large data bases
The case for access control on XML relationships
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Information and knowledge management
Compressed accessibility map: efficient access control for XML
VLDB '02 Proceedings of the 28th international conference on Very Large Data Bases
Optimizing the secure evaluation of twig queries
VLDB '02 Proceedings of the 28th international conference on Very Large Data Bases
Controlling access to published data using cryptography
VLDB '03 Proceedings of the 29th international conference on Very large data bases - Volume 29
Client-based access control management for XML documents
VLDB '04 Proceedings of the Thirtieth international conference on Very large data bases - Volume 30
A practical mandatory access control model for XML databases
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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In authorization-transparent access control, user queries are formulated against the database schema rather than against authorization views that transform and hide data. The Truman and the Non-Truman are two approaches to authorization transparency where in a Truman model, queries that violate the access restrictions are modified transparently by the system to only reveal accessible data, while in a Non-Truman model, such queries are rejected. The advantage of a Non-Truman model is that the semantics of user queries is not changed by the access-control mechanism. This work presents an access-control mechanism for XML, under the Non-Truman model. Security policies are specified as parameterized rules formulated using XPath. The rules specify relationships between elements, that should be concealed from users. Hence, not only elements, but also edges and paths within an XML document, can be concealed. The access-control mechanism authorizes only valid queries, i.e., queries that do not disclose the existence of concealed relationships. The additional expressive power, provided by these rules, over element-based authorization techniques is illustrated. The proposed access-control mechanism can either serve as a substitute for views or as a layer for verifying that specific relationships are concealed by a view.