Efficient collision search attacks on SHA-0
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Finding collisions in the full SHA-1
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of the hash functions MD4 and RIPEMD
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
How to break MD5 and other hash functions
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE
ACISP '08 Proceedings of the 13th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
New Message Differences for Collision Attacks on MD4 and MD5
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Multi-collision attack on the compression functions of MD4 and 3-pass HAVAL
ICISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Finding SHA-1 characteristics: general results and applications
ASIACRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
How to construct sufficient conditions for hash functions
VIETCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Cryptology in Vietnam
Improved preimage attack on one-block MD4
Journal of Systems and Software
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Applications of SAT solvers to cryptanalysis of hash functions
SAT'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing
New message difference for MD4
FSE'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Analysis of differential attacks in ARX constructions
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
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The ground-breaking results of Wang et al. have attracted a lot of attention to the collision resistance of hash functions. In their articles, Wang et al. give input differences, differential paths and the corresponding conditions that allow to find collisions with a high probability. However, Wang et al. do not explain how these paths were found. The common assumption is that they were found by hand with a great deal of intuition. In this article, we present an algorithm that allows to find paths in an automated way. Our algorithm is successful for MD4. We have found over 1000 differential paths so far. Amongst them, there are paths that have fewer conditions in the second round than the path of Wang et al. for MD4. This makes them better suited for the message modification techniques that were also introduced by Wang et al.