Collisions for the compression function of MD5
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improved Collision Attacks on MD4 and MD5
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
The second-preimage attack on MD4
CANS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
Searching for differential paths in MD4
FSE'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
A study of the MD5 attacks: insights and improvements
FSE'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Cryptanalysis of the hash functions MD4 and RIPEMD
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
How to break MD5 and other hash functions
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Improved collision attack on MD4 with probability almost 1
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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In 2005, collision resistance of several hash functions was broken by Wang et al. The strategy of determining message differences is the most important part of collision attacks against hash functions. So far, many researchers have tried to analyze Wang et al.'s method and proposed improved collision attacks. Although several researches proposed improved attacks, all improved results so far were based on the same message differences proposed by Wang et al. In this paper, we propose new message differences for collision attacks on MD4 and MD5. Our message differences of MD4 can generate a collision with complexity of less than two MD4 computations, which is faster than the original Wang et al.'s attack, and moreover, than the all previous attacks. This is the first result that improves the complexity of collision attack by using different message differences from Wang et al.'s. Regarding MD5, so far, no other message difference from Wang et al.'s is known. Therefore, study for constructing method of other message differences on MD5 should be interesting. Our message differences of MD5 generates a collision with complexity of 242 MD5 computations, which is slower than the latest best attack. However, since our attack needs only 1 bit difference, it has some advantages in terms of message freedom of collision messages.