Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
A Reasoning Model Based on the Production of Acceptable Arguments
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Dynamic Coalition Formation among Rational Agents
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Generating Coalition Structures with Finite Bound from the Optimal Guarantees
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The Advantages of Compromising in Coalition Formation with Incomplete Information
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Task allocation via coalition formation among autonomous agents
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Modelling coalitions: ATL + argumentation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Social Viewpoints for Arguing about Coalitions
PRIMA '08 Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
An Argumentative Approach for Modelling Coalitions Using ATL
Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems
Finding partitions of arguments with Dung's properties via SCSPs
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Argue to agree: A case-based argumentation approach
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Argumentation theoretic foundations for abstract dependence networks
AT'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Agreement Technologies
Coalitions of Arguments: An Approach with Constraint Programming
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on the Italian Conference on Computational Logic: CILC 2011
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Autonomous agents working in multi-agent environments need to cooperate in order to fulfill tasks. Generally, an agent cannot perform a task alone and needs help from the other agents. One of the solutions to this problem is to look for groups of agents which are able to perform the desired tasks better. Different algorithms have then been proposed for the task allocation via coalition formation. This last is generally seen as a two steps process: i) constructing the different solutions (called coalitions structures), then ii) discussing these solutions between the agents in order to select the best ones which will be adopted. This paper provides a unified formal framework for constructing the coalitions structures. In fact, we will show that the problem of coalition formation can be defined in terms only of a set of coalitions whose structures are abstract, a conflict relationship between the coalitions and a preference relation between the coalitions. Three semantics for coalitions structures will be proposed: a basic semantics which will return a unique coalition structure, stable semantics and preferred semantics. These two last may return several coalitions structures at the same time. A proof theory of the basic semantics will also be proposed. The aim of this proof theory is to test whether a given coalition will be acceptable for the agent or not without computing the whole structure. We will show that this framework is general enough to capture different propositions made in the literature. An instantiation of our framework is given and its properties are studied.